After decades of single issue movements and identity politics on the U.S. left, the series of large demonstrations beginning in 1999 in Seattle have led many to wonder if activist politics can now come together around a common theme of global justice. This book pursues the prospects for progressive political movements in the 21st century with case studies of ten representative movements, including the anti-globalization forces, environmental interest groups, and new takes on the peace movement.

Despite the presumed frequency of conflicts of interest in scientific peer review, there is a paucity of data in the literature reporting on the frequency and type of conflicts that occur, particularly with regard to the peer review of basic science applications. To address this gap, the American Institute of Biological Sciences conducted a retrospective analysis of conflict of interest data from the peer review of 282 biomedical research applications via several onsite review panels. The overall conflicted-ness of these (...) panels was significantly lower than that reported for regulatory review. In addition, the majority of identified conflicts were institutional or collaborative in nature. No direct financial conflicts were identified, although this is likely due to the relatively basic science nature of the research. It was also found that 65 % of identified conflicts were manually detected by AIBS staff searching reviewer CVs and application documents, with the remaining 35 % resulting from self-reporting. The lack of self-reporting may be in part attributed to a lack of perceived risk of the conflict. This result indicates that many potential conflicts go unreported in peer review, underscoring the importance of improving detection methods and standardizing the reporting of reviewer and applicant conflict of interest information. (shrink)

A partir de análise da argumentação habermasiana realizada em sua obra “Conhecimento e Interesse” original de 1968, a qual trabalhamos a partir da tradução de 1987; e ancorados nos trabalhos dos filósofos brasileiros Durão, publicado em seu livro “A crítica de Habermas à dedução transcendental de Kant” de 1996 e Hansen, em seu artigo publicado na Revista Crítica, intitulado “Os riscos da crítica da sociedade” de 1998, refletimos, nesse artigo, sobre como Habermas resgata a Teoria do Conhecimento da maneira desvirtuada (...) que a legou o positivismo comteano, perpassando por Freud e Marx para recuperá-la como uma Teoria Crítica da Sociedade. E, apresentamos o advento da Era da Informação e as facilidades de comunicação que a acompanham, para apresentar o modelo da Educação à Distância como uma forma eficaz de ampliar o alcance da Crítica Social como autorreflexão que torna o conhecimento um instrumento crítico não só do indivíduo, mas também da sociedade. (shrink)

Resumo: O objetivo do presente artigo é contrapor à acusação de tecnofóbico, erroneamente dirigida a Hans Jonas, a sua proposta de uma ethical turn da tecnologia, cujas bases estariam na capacidade ética de impor contenções ao avanço utópico do progresso técnico, algo que leva a ética da responsabilidade ao polêmico conceito de “heurística do temor”. Para tanto, parte-se de um exame sobre o projeto jonasiano de uma filosofia da tecnologia, cuja terceira perspectiva seria valorativa, sendo esta a que ele melhor (...) desenvolveu. A partir daí, analisa-se qual seria o valor da tecnologia, com base no ponto de vista da vida para então se examinar, estrategicamente, a posição de Gerard Lebrun, para quem Jonas estaria entre os filósofos tecnofóbicos. O intuito, nesse caso, é demonstrar a incoerência de tal interpretação, precisamente porque o pensador francês, com grande atuação no Brasil, confunde a proposta da reorientação ética com a imposição de um poder exterior, de cunho paralisante.: The purpose of this article is to counter against the accusation of technophobic, wrongly directed to Hans Jonas, his proposal for an ethical turn of technology, whose bases would be on the ethical capacity to impose restraint on the utopian advance of technical progress, something that leads to the ethics of responsibility to the controversial concept of “heuristic of fear”. To do so, we started from an examination of the Jonasian project of a philosophy of technology, whose third perspective would be valuable, which is the one he developed best. From there, we will analyze what would be the value of technology from the point of view of life and then strategically analyze the position of Gerard Lebrun for whom Jonas should be placed among technophobic philosophers. Our aim, in this case, is to demonstrate the inconsistency of such an interpretation, precisely because the French thinker with an important presence in Brazil, confuses the proposal of ethical reorientation with the imposition of an external power, of a paralyzing type. (shrink)

Pretende-se nesse trabalho analisar a crítica do filósofo judeu-alemão Hans Jonas à ideia de progresso e sua perspectiva prática, a ideia de desenvolvimento. Tal perspectiva, segundo o autor, surge de uma mudança no status do saber na era moderna, o que significa reconhecer que a ciência moderna será colocada a serviço dessa ideia. O avanço da problemática ambiental, contudo, exige uma reavaliação ética de tal cenário, fazendo com que a simples utopia do desenvolvimento seja substituída por medidas de prevenção, antecipação (...) dos efeitos negativos e até mesmo por freios voluntários. A política, assim, deve reorientar a ciência em nome de um novo papel: não apenas analisar o fato ocorrido, mas prevê-lo e, quiçá, contribuir para evita-lo. (shrink)

A formal Ethics Consultation Service (ECS) can provide significant help to patients, families and hospital staff. As with any other form of clinical consultation, documentation of the process and the advice rendered is very important. Upon review of the published consult documentation practices of other ECSs, we judged that none of them were sufficiently detailed or structured to meet the needs and purposes of a clinical ethics consultation. Thus, we decided to share our method in order to advance the practice (...) of ethics consultation. Here, we describe a method of ECS documentation practice, including use of a formal consult report template, as well as a log for maintaining a chronological record of the consultations performed. These two documents facilitate order and organisation of the ECS. They also enable the ECS to keep an account of professional time and experience, enable quick consult trend assessments (by consult theme or ward, for example) and establish a potential registry of consults for future research study. This method of documentation, we believe, not only contributes significantly to the primary purpose of the consultation—namely, the evincing and sharing of ethical opinion about a case—but also enables consultants to improve their practice and to pursue research on clinical ethics consultation. (shrink)

Nesse artigo eu proponho, partindo da distinção entre conceitos semânticos e conceitos ontológicos, a separação entre descrição semântica e postulação de entidades. A postulação de uma entidade implica o fornecimento de um critério de identificação, isto é, a verdade de uma asserção de identidade entre dois dispositivos de designação. Isso parece indicar que a existência da entidade seria garantida pela simples existência de um critério de identificação. Porém, esta é uma condição de significatividade para um termo referencial: que ele codifique (...) ou esteja associado a uma descrição identificadora. Tal descrição identificadora não pode, de modo algum, ser confundida com uma condição de existência para a entidade em questão. (shrink)

Lysias, describing how the Thirty were established in the government of Athens, begins with the sentence ναστς δ θηραμνης κλευσεν ὑμς τρι$κοντα νδράσιν πιτρΨαι τν πóλιν τῇ πολιτεᾳ χρσθαι ν Δρακοντδης πφαινεν Commenting on the last clause the judicious Thirlwall observes that ‘the precise meaning of these words is very doubtful. There is almost equal difficulty, whether we suppose that they refer to a proposition then made, or to one which was to be made, by Dracontides.’ Thirlwall has not expressed (...) his meaning as precisely as Lysias; the uncertainty lies, not in the words, nor in the reference intended by Lysias, but in the mind of the historian, who is conscious that, whether he refers the proposition of Dracontides to the occasion indicated by Lysias or to another, he will encounter almost equal difficulty. The difficulty however, arising from the apparent inconsistencies in the evidence of the ancient authorities on the date of the appointment of the Thirty, is not Thirlwall's only, and after a century of discussion it still vexes every student of the period. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:95. HUME AND NONLOGI CAL NECESSITY Flew substantially agrees with our main themes in Causal Powers, though he thinks our discussion should begin closer to the work of Hume himself. What to reply? Needless to say, we find no fault in his agreement with us and are happy for his support. The answer to the second part of his response is far more complicated and requires a bit of (...) background from Causal Powers. While contemporary Humeans differ in important details, they share certain commitments which constitute what we call the Humean tradition. This tradition and contemporary refinements of it are the targets of our criticisms and provide the crucial foil for presenting our own positive theory of natural necessity. Two important strands of the tradition, as we characterized it, are the In-principle (No-contradiction) argument and the argument against the possibility of a priori knowledge of matters of fact. (i) Since nature may change its course, 'C and not E' is not self-inconsistent. To the Humean the phrase "change in the course of nature" seems intuitively clear; to us it seems utterly opaque and itself in great need of analysis. We show that there are two possible interpretations of the phrase, one of which is selfinconsistent while the other, though coherent, does not establish the Humean conclusion that there is no necessary connection between matters of fact, (ii) The Humean assumes that 'p is contingent' and 'p is a posteriori. ' and 'p is necessary' and 'p is a priori, ' are materially equivalent, and then argues easily that since all causal propositions are a posteriori none of them can be a priori and so necessary. We offer numerous arguments to break up the assumed equivalencies and thus defeat the conclusion 96. of the Humean argument. We show that while all scientific propositions are indeed known a posteriori it does not follow that there are no justifiable propositions about natural kinds. Philosophers in other traditions have made a similar point in showing that "metaphysical necessity" does not entail "epistemic necessity." Indeed, in contrast to many contemporary Humeans, we are complete fallibilists and even reject the notion that there is a self-contained given which is incorrigible. In portraying various strands of "the Humean tradition" in Causal Powers, we were, of course, imputing these views to Hume himself. How could it be otherwise? In referring to the Humean tradition instead of to Hume we meant only to indicate (as do contemporary Humeans) that we were concerned only with what we take to be still very much alive in Hume's work. Hence it is puzzling to read Flew' s remark that we relate our own contributions to Hume "only most distantly." That we and contemporary Humeans are always correct in what we ascribe to Hume and in what we take to be still philosophically alive in his work may be open to question, but since Flew does not challenge any specific ascription there is no alleged misinterpretation to defend ourselves against. Flew suggests that we should show Hume to be wrong at the outset — convict him, so to speak, on the grounds of the inconsistencies in his own texts. He refers to the famous definition of 'cause' in the Inquiry, where Hume gives a factual rendition of 'cause' and then innocently equates it with a counterfactual counterpart. C. J. Ducasse, for many years an ardent critic of Hume texts, made this point nicely in 1924 in his splendid book Causation and the Types of Necessity. After quoting Hume's definition in the Inquiry Ducasse remarked: This statement, incidentally, is immediately followed by: "Or in other words where, if the first object had not been, the second never had 97. existed." But this, far from being only a different way of saying precisely the same thing, is on the contrary a precise way of saying a very different thing. For Hume very definitely maintains elsewhere that there is never any "if-ness" objectively observable at all, but only a "that-ness" constantly repeated in experience. So that only the first statement is consistent with his empiricism, and even in that first statement the words "are followed" should in strictness be replaced by... (shrink)

Cet ouvrage est une réédition numérique d’un livre paru au XXe siècle, désormais indisponible dans son format d’origine.

"Hegel and the Foundations of Literary Theory: Do the various forms of literary theory - deconstruction, Marxism, new historicism, feminism, post-colonialism, and cultural/digital studies - have anything in common? If so, what are the fundamental principles of theory? What is its ideological orientation? Can it still be of use to us in understanding basic intellectual and ethical dilemmas of our time? These questions continue to perplex both students and teachers of literary theory. Habib finds the answers in theory's largely unacknowledged (...) roots in the thought of German philosopher Hegel. Hegel's insights continue to frame the very terms of theory to this day. Habib explains Hegel's complex ideas and how they have percolated through the intellectual history of the last century. This book will interest teachers and students of literature, literary theory and the history of ideas, illuminating how our modern world came into being, and how we can better understand the salient issues of our own time"--. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é pesquisar, no subterrâneo do pensamento de Martim Lutero, indícios de uma Denkweise, um modo de pensar que lhe seria peculiar. A hipótese é que há uma consistência filosófica nesse pensamento, mas que suas características o distinguem das razões filosóficas tradicionais da escolástica tardia. Os anos de imersão na Bíblia deram a Lutero não só uma interpretação da justiça da fé que foi revolucionária em sua época, mas também um modo de pensar que revela características do (...) que atualmente se vem redescobrindo como “pensamento semítico”. Esses elementos, em tensão criativa com a razão grega e subordinados à estrutura paradoxal do pensamento cristão, conferem um estatuto filosófico característico ao pensamento de Lutero. (shrink)

Water values serve as an entry point into the intricacies of public policies and management approaches. Values are contingent assessments that emerge out of socio-ecological relations and reflect particular demands, legacies and opportunities. The concept of value positionality is introduced as the synthesis of multiple expressions of worthiness cherished by a social group. Positionality is a metaphor that connects the phenomenological understanding of water value with the politics of everyday life and the broader politico-institutional framework. It entails a cluster of (...) meanings expressed through territorialised interactions across time, locations and scales. Positionalities converge or depart according to value praxis, that is, the clash of competing valuation approaches seeking legitimisation. (shrink)

We present a derivation of the homogeneous Lorentz transformations that arrives immediately at the general form without the usual specialization in thex direction.

If the exclusive promotion of values inimical to our basic humanity extends to the health care policy arena, we face a defensive, restricted, impersonal and ultimately impoverished health care system. Americans know it already as ‘managed-care’. This is why it is crucial for health policy analysts to make explicit the role of values in policy-making, especially that involving the input of ‘value-neutral’ economics. The nature of any clinical effectiveness policy will be determined by the understanding of cost-effectiveness employed in its (...) design and implementation. Given that cost-effectiveness is nowadays usually defined according to health economists’ criteria, the battle over the meaning of clinical effectiveness is a significant development in health economics’ move to assume control of the NHS. (shrink)